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THE VICE-PRINCIPAL IN PENNSYLVANIA LAW.
In order to appreciate the definition of a vice-principal, as
that term is understood by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, it is necessary to examine the cases defining the duties
which a master owes a servant in his employ.
The duties which the law imposes upon a master may be
grouped under five heads.
I. The duty to provide safe premises. It is the duty of the
master to provide premises, which are reasonably safe for use
by those in his employ. The duty is not one of insurance,
but simply a duty to exercise reasonable care, " reasonable,"
with regard to the general character of the business and the
nature of the work, which the servant is called upon to per-
form: Penna. R. R. Co. v. Zinki, 126 Pa. 288, (1889);
Moules v. D. & H. Canal Co., 141 Pa. 632, (1891); Vanesse
v. Catsburg Coal Co., 159 Pa. 403, (1893); Wanamaker v.
Burke, iii Pa. 423, (1886); O'Donnell v. Alleghen , Val. R.
R. Co., 59 Pa. 239, (I868) ; Jonston v. Ott Bros., 155 Pa.
17, (1893); Clougl v. Hoffman, 132 Pa. 626, (189o); Pizzi-
russi v. Dyer, 7 Montg. Co., 195, (1891) ; Bennett v. Stand-
ard Plate Glass Co., 158 Pa. 120, (1893) ; Pottstown Iron Co.
v. Fanning, 114 Pa. 234, (1886); MfcCombs v. P.& W. Ry.
Co., 130 Pa. 182, (1889) ; Rick v. Cramp, 12 Atl. Rep. 495,
(I888); Everson v. Rolinson, 8 At. 194, (1887); Rooney v.
Carson, I6I Pa. 26, (1894); Crawford v. Stewart, 8 At. 5,
(1887); Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42, (1890); Stoltenburgv.
Railroad, 165 Pa. 377, (1895).
II. The duty to provide safe appliances. It is the duty of
the master to provide his servants with appliances and tools,
which are reasonably safe for the purposes of the particular
business in which the master and the servants are engaged.
The extent to which the term "reasonable" is used in this
connection is best illustrated by the cases defining the char-
acter of the appliances to be furnished. The master is not
bound to provide the newest, nor the most improved, appli-
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ances-he is only bound to provide those which others in the
same general line of business commonly use: Pitts., Connells-
ville &c. R. R. Co. v. Sentmeyer, 92 Pa. 276, (1879); Kelder v.
Sclwenk, 144 Pa. 348, (1891); P. W. & B. R. R. Co. v.
Keenan, 103 Pa. 124, (1883); Schall v. Cole, 107 Pa. I,
(1884); Augerstein v. Jones, 139 Pa. 183, (189o); Fritz v.
Jenner, I66 Pa. 292, (1895); Murphy v. Crossan, 98 Pa. 495,
(188i); Burrell v. Gowen, 134 Pa. 527, (189o); Elkins v.
P. R.R. Co., 171 Pa. 121, (1895) ; Melchert v. Smith Brqeng
Co., I4O Pa. 448, (1891).
III. The duty to provide instruction. Wherever the em-
ployment is one which is necessarily attended with danger,
and the danger is not one to be apprehended by the ordinary
servant, it is the duty of the master to give proper warning.
The cases defining the scope of this duty have usually been
cases where the injury has resulted to a servant of tender
years. As a general rule, in the case of experienced work-
men, fully cognizant of the dangers of the business, the
master is not bound to give any warning: Davis v. R. R. Co.,
5 Pa. C. C. 567, (1888); Wagnzer v. Jayne Chemical Co., 147
Pa. 475, (1892); Lebberingv. Struthers, 157 Pa. 312, (1893);
McMellen v. Union News Co., 144 Pa. 332, (1891); Lee v.
Electric L. H. & P. Co., 14o Pa. 6 18, (1891) ; Zurn v. Tetlow,
134 Pa. 213, (189o); Kepler v. Schwenk, 151 Pa. 505,(1892);
Tagg v. McGeorge, 155 Pa. 368, (1893); Neilson v. Hillside
Coal& Iron Co., 168 Pa. 256, (1895); Penna. Coal Co. v.
Nee, 13 Atl. 841, (1888).
IV. The duty to provide competent fellow-servants. It is
the duty of the master to employ servants of the character
and ability of those ordinarily employed by others in the same
line of business: Frazier v. Penn. R. R. Co., 38 Pa. 104,
(186o); Walton v. Bryn Mawr Hotel Co., 16o Pa. 3, (1894);
Weger v. Pa. R. R. Co., 55 Pa. 46o, (1867); Rickettv. Stevens,
133 Pa. 538, (189o):; Trainer v. Railroad Co., 137 Pa. 148,
(189o); R. R. Co. v. Decker, 82 Pa. 119, (1876).
V. The duty to provide a system of work. It is the duty of
the master to provide a system of work in those cases where, on
account of the number of those employed, as well as the
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complicated details of the business, there is danger of injury
unless some method or system is adopted. The illustration
furnished by Mr. Justice Paxson, in Lewis v. Sezfert, I 16 Pa. 628,
is instructive. Speaking of the duty which a railroad company
owes to its servants, he said: "It is equally clear that it was
its duty to frame and promulgate such rules and schedules for
the moving of its trains, as would afford reasonable safety to
the operatives who engaged in moving them. This is a direct
positive duty, which the company owed its employees and for
the failure to perform which it would be responsible to any
person injured as a consequence thereof, whether such person
be a passenger or an employee. It would be a monstrous
doctrine to hold that a railroad could frame such schedules as
would invariably, or even probably, result in collisions and
loss of life:" Payne v. Reese, 1oo Pa. 301, (1882); McCombs
v. Railway, 130 Pa. 182, (1889); Harn v. Smith, 6 Pa. C. C.
207, (1888); Stevens v. Martin, 23 W. N. C. 475, (1889).
In the case of Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42, (189o), the
court defines the duty of a master to his servant to be, first,
the duty to provide his servants with a suitable place to work,
second, with suitable tools and machinery to use and, third,
with reasonably competent fellow-servants with whom to
work. In addition to these, where the servant is young or
inexperienced in the use of tools or machinery, it is the
master's duty to see that he is instructed in these particulars
and to warn him of such dangers as are peculiar to the use
and care of the machinery with which his labor brings him in
contact. The definition of a vice-principal is then embodied
in the following statement: " If the principal be a corporation,
or be unable for any reason to discharge these obligations in
person, they must be discharged through an officer, agent or
foreman. The person, who is thus put in the place of the
principal to perform for him the duties which the law imposes,
is a vice-principal, and quoad hoc represents the principal so
that his act is the act of the principal." In other words, the
vice-principal described in this case is anyone to whom the
master delegates the performance of the duty to provide safe
premises, safe appliances, competent fellow-servants, instruc-
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tion for the ignorant or inexperienced, or a system or method
of work.
Before applying this definition to the facts of the case of
Ross v. Walker, and the cases which follow it, it may be
profitable to examine some of the elementary principles gov-
erning the liability of one person for the torts of another. If
one charged with the performance of a duty towards another,
is negligent in the performance of that duty, and that negli-
gence results in damage to the person to whom the duty is
owed, it may be made the basis of an action. Thus, if the
master is negligent in the performance of any one of the duties
enumerated above, the servant who is injured thereby may
recover without reference to any doctrine of the law of master
and servant. If the law imposes upon A. the performance of
any duty towards B., B. may recover for any damage, the legal
result of A.'s neglect. See Payne v. Reese, ioo Pa. 301
Rummel v. Dillworth, 131 Pa. 509.
It is equally true, that if a person owing a duty towards
another, delegates the performance of that duty to one who
negligently executes it, the person owing the duty is respon-
sible. And this rule is independent of the general principles
of master and servant. It is an elementary principle of liability
in tort that one charged with a duty is responsible for the
negligence of one who assists him in the performance of the
duty. When, therefore, it is said that anyone to whom a
master delegates the performance of the five duties enumerated,
is as regards the performance of these duties, a vice-principal,
a new term is introduced to express an old and familiar
relation. The master is responsible for the negligence of one
to whom the duty is delegated, upon well settled principles of
the law of Torts. See remarks of Paxson, J. : Lewis v. Seifert,
I16 Pa. 528 ; Frazier v. Pa. R. R. Co., 38 Pa. lo4 (I86o);
National Tube Works v. Bedel, 96 Pa. 175 (1881); Hug-les v.
B. & 0. R. R., 164 Pa. 178 (1894).
With these principles in mind, it is proposed to examine
critically the case of Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42 (189o).
Walker, the defendant, was engaged in erecting an iron bridge.
Duffy was his foreman. Ross, the plaintiff, was a laborer,
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employed with many others, in building the bridge. He was
hurt by falling from a scaffold in consequence of the breaking
of a stick of timber which supported it. It was in evidence
that Walker had furnished proper materials and had selected,
in Duffy, a competent foreman. In the construction of the
scaffold, Duffy negligently selected a defective plank, which
gave way under the weight of the men employed upon it.
The defendant's counsel asked the court to instruct the jury,
"If they found the defendant put the work in charge of a
competent foreman, and provided suitable materials .for the
scaffolding in sufficient quantity, then he was guilty of no
negligence and the verdict must be in his favor." The learned
judge refused the instruction asked for, and went on to say,
that, "if Duffey was in the entire charge and control of the
work of erecting the bridge, determining what materials were
to be used for the scaffolding, employing and discharging
men, and directing where and what materials were to be used,
he was acting for Mr. Walker, as vice-principal, and his negli-
gence would be that of the defendant." The correctness of
this definition of a vice-principal was the question raised by
the several assignments of error in the Supreme Court.
In considering the question, the court recognized the exist-
ence of the several duties which the master owes his servants
and declared that the person to whom the master delegated
the performance of any of these duties, is a vice-principal, for
whose negligence the master is responsible.
If the case were one of first impression, it is submitted that
it would not be unfair to assume that the definition meant to
imply that a master was liable, where he delegated the per-
formance of anyone of the positive duties, which he owes to
the servant, to a subordinate who is negligent in the execution
of his work.
Certainly, if a "vice principal" means anything, it means
a person who so far represents the principal that the law
c7harges the principal with liability for the acts and comissions
of such person. Thus, if A., an employer, delegates to B. the
duty of selecting competent fellow-servants for the other
servant's in A.'s employ, and B. is negligent in the selection,
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B.'s negligence is the negligence of A. to the extent that A. is-
liable to a servant injured by reason of such negligence -
Trainor v. R. R., 137 Pa. 148 (189o); Huntington R. R. v.
Decker, 82 Pa. I 19 (1876). It was this application of the
principle which Mr. Justice Paxson had in mind when he said
in the case of Lewis v. Seifert, I I6 Pa. 628, (1887), " But
there are some duties which the master owes to the servant,
and from which he cannot relieve himself except by perform-
ance. Thus, the master owes to every servant the duty of
providing a reasonably safe place in which to work and rea-
sonably safe instruments, tools, and machinery with which to
work. This is a direct personal and absolute obligation; and
while the master may delegate these duties to an agent, such
an agent stands in the place of his principal, and the latter is
responsible for the acts of such agent. And where the master
or superior places the entire charge of his business, or a dis-
tinct branch of it, in the hands of an agent or subordinate,
exercising no discretion or oversight of his own, the master
is held liable for the negligence of such agent or subordi-
nate."
The court, in delivering judgment in Ross v. Walker, did
not adopt the view of Paxson, J., in Lewis v. Seifert, but re-
versed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon the verdict in
the court below, for the following reasons: "It was the duty of
Walker as employer or principal, to provide the men em-
ployed to build this bridge with suitable machinery and ap-
pliances; to furnish materials sufficient in quantity and suit-
able in character; to employ men who were reasonably
competent to do the work for which they were wanted, and
to give them the benefit of the services of a reasonably com-
petent foreman. All this, as we understand the evidence, was
done. If so, the employer had filled the measure of his legal
liability to his workmen. For an error in judgment, or for a
neglect of duty on the part of anyone of his employees,
from the foreman down to the humblest unskilled laborer, he
was not liable. It was not material to this inquiry to know
whether ' Duffey had entire charge and control of the work,'
as a foreman or not; nor to know whether he selected from
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-the mass furnished by the employer the materials to be used
for any particular purpose or not; nor, whether he hired and
discharged men or not. The inquiry is, was it the employer's
duty, after having provided materials ample in quantity and
quality, to supervise the selection of every stick out of the
mass for every purpose? To state this question is to
answer it."
It is submitted that the answer to the question put by the
court might, with more consistency, have been in favor of
the master's liability. It was admittedly the master's duty to
furnish a reasonably safe scaffold. If he had himself negli-
gently selected a defective piece of timber, he would have
been liable; if he had delegated to his foreman the duty of
selecting the timber and building the scaffold for him, he would
have been liable. In other words, if the master had delegated
performance of the entire duty, he would have been liable to
the plaintiff. Not having delegated performance of the entire
duty but only of a part, according to the decision in Ross v.
Walker, the master is not charged with liability for negligence
in the performance of that part,-surely a startling conclusion.
Nor is it any answer to say that the duty ceased the mo-
ment the materials were delivered. The duty is a duty to
furnish a reasonably safe appliance or place upon which to
work. The foreman was acting as the representative of his
master in the erection of the appliance, and for his negligence
.the master ought to be held responsible.
John A. McCartly.
Philadelphia, December, 1896.
